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LAURA NEWHART 
THE BONOBO MIRROR PROJECT 
 
I. Introduction 
I undertook “The Bonobo Mirror Project” within the context of a graduate level course 
entitled Primate Behavior and Conservation that was jointly sponsored by Miami 
University of Ohio, the Cincinnati Zoo and Botanical Gardens, and Project Dragonfly. 
The goal of such “Zoo Expedition” courses is to promote inquiry-based learning, 
community involvement, and conservation. I found it both challenging and rewarding to 
combine my philosophical training with this very empirically based scientific method of 
inquiry. The empirical question that “The Bonobo Mirror Project” attempts to answer is: 
How does the ratio of positive to negative comments made by visitors to the indoor 
bonobo exhibit at the Cincinnati Zoo about the bonobos compare to the same ratio of 
positive to negative comments made directly to the bonobos? I interpret the results of my 
inquiry, and their moral significance, through the more subjective lens of Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s solution to the traditional philosophical problem of the existence of other minds.  
Our beliefs about the existence of animal minds and their varying levels of complexity 
inform our moral judgments on the appropriate treatment and handling of these animals. 
 
II. Positivism vs. Anthropomorphism 
Whether we base our obligation to treat animals ethically on Singer’s position that those 
animals are sentient, and hence able to feel pleasure and pain, or on Tom Regan’s more 
rigorous requirement that those animals that deserve ethical treatment are subjects-of-a-
life in the sense that they have beliefs, desires, memories, a sense of their own future, and 
a psychosocial identity over time, we still need to have knowledge concerning the 
contents of their consciousness, i.e., their inner subjective experience. 
 The search for this knowledge has typically resulted in a clash between two 
camps, i.e., the positivists, or those who are methodologically committed not to allow 
anything into their theories that cannot be verified through empirical observation by the 
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five physical senses, and the advocates of anthropomorphism, those who believe that we 
can draw conclusions about animal consciousness/subjectivity on the basis of similarities 
between their behavior and ours. On the positivist side, with the increased urgency of 
demands for the ethical treatment of animals, there has been increased research activity 
into the anatomy and physiology of animals, e.g., the structure of animal brains and 
nervous systems, the presence of endogenous opiates, whether their physiological 
responses are modified by analgesics, etc. There have also been more effective defenses 
and fine-tuning of anthropomorphism, including the claim by Bernard Rollin that if 
positivists are not willing to admit anything into their theories that can’t be experienced 
by the senses, then in addition to the existence of animal minds, they must also give up 
the existence of human minds and the inter-subjective verification by observation upon 
which their method depends (137).  
 One seemingly effective fine-tuning of anthropomorphism has been proposed by 
Josephine Donovan. Drawing on literary theory and an ethics of care, in “Feminism and 
the Treatment of Animals: From Care to Dialogue,” Donovan claims that we understand 
the inner states or contents of the consciousness of animals in the same way that we 
understand those of people, i.e., by reading their behavior as signifiers for these inner 
states. While it helps to have a general knowledge of the species to which the animal 
belongs and a certain familiarity with the individual animal we are “reading,” we can 
draw conclusions about the subjective experiences of animals by way of arguments from 
analogy based on their similarities with humans. As Donovan states: 
If that dog is yelping, leaping about, licking an open cut, and since if I had 
an open wound I know I would similarly be (or feel like) crying and 
moving about anxiously because of the pain, I therefore conclude that the 
animal is experiencing the same kind of pain as I would and is expressing 
distress about it. (50) 
Thus, according to Donovan, the question of whether we can understand what the 
behavior of animals means for their subjective conscious experience is a moot one. We 
do it successfully all the time. Is it possible that we might be wrong in our 
interpretations? Yes, but as Donovan reminds us, we can also be wrong in our 
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interpretations of human behavior. In such cases, an ethic of care advises that we improve 
the quality of our attention, where attention is seen as a disciplinary practice informed by 
“openness, receptivity, empathy, sensitivity, and imagination” (51). 
 
III. The Problem of Other Minds and Sartre’s Solution 
As the criticism of positivism by Rollin noted above suggests, the problem of the 
existence of animal minds (or the content of animal consciousness) can be viewed as a 
subset of the traditional philosophical problem of the existence of other minds in general. 
Simply stated, we can (and perhaps should) doubt the existence of human minds with as 
little difficulty as we might doubt the existence of animal minds. The philosophical 
problem of the existence of other minds is usually stated in this way: I know that I have a 
mind because I have privileged access to the contents of my consciousness through 
introspection. I don’t have that kind of privileged access to the contents of anyone else’s 
consciousness. So, for all I know, everyone else could just be robots with disks implanted 
in the backs of their necks,  programming them to act as if they have a mind like mine. 
For all I know, my mind could be the only one in existence.  
 In Being and Nothingness, French existentialist Jean Paul Sartre’s magnum opus 
in which he describes in intricate detail the structures of human consciousness from a 
subjective phenomenological perspective, Sartre tells us that the traditional realist 
solution to the problem of other minds is to make a series of inductive inferences from 
my mind to my body to your body to your mind—in short, an argument from analogy 
based on physical similarities. I have a mind, and my body is like this. Your body is 
similar to mine, so you must have a mind like mine as well.  
 In Being and Nothingness, Sartre provides a more subjective and more immediate 
demonstration of the existence of other minds; and, in doing so he provides an alternative 
to both positivism and anthropomorphism. For Sartre, human relations are characterized 
by a battle to the death for subjectivity. Since Sartre believed we could not both be 
subjects at the same time, one party in a relationship will be the subject and the other will 
be the object, although there is the possibility that the two can switch places.  Hence, 
Sartre’s famous saying, “Hell is other people.” Sartre believed that you can tell you’re in 
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the presence of another mind (or subject) when you feel yourself being taken as an object 
in their consciousness; or, to use more of Sartre’s terminology, when you feel your 
freedom or transcendence being “trumped,” so to speak, by theirs. As Sartre describes it:  
It is in and through the revelation of my being-as-object for the Other that 
I must be able to apprehend the presence of his being-as-subject. For just 
as the Other is a probable object for me-as-subject, so I can discover 
myself in the process of becoming a probable object for only a certain 
subject… In a word, my apprehension of the Other in the world as 
probably being a man refers to my permanent possibility of being-seen-
by-him; that is to the permanent possibility that a subject who sees me may 
be substituted for the object seen by me. “Being-seen-by-the-Other” is the 
truth of “seeing-the-Other.” (256-257) 
This experience of “seeing-the-Other” manifests itself as a sense of pride, possibly, but 
more often shame in the object that I am for the Other, which Sartre describes as “an 
immediate shudder which runs through me from head to foot without discursive 
preparation” (222). It is not the result of a tenuous string of inferences from my mind to 
my body to your body to your mind in the external world. 
 
IV. The Mark Test 
The impetus for “The Bonobo Mirror Project” was a paper by my colleague, Professor 
Robert Mitchell, entitled “Subjectivity and Self-Recognition in Animals.” In the paper, 
Mitchell describes a particular example in which the debate between positivism and 
anthropomorphism implicitly plays itself out to the detriment of the goal of ascertaining 
the level of complexity of consciousness or subjectivity on the part of various animals. 
The example involves a mark test whereby individual animals have a visible mark placed 
on their face and then are put before a mirror. The animals are observed as to whether 
they make physical gestures in reference to the mark while looking in the mirror, thereby 
indicating the capacity for self-recognition, which is considered to be a necessary feature 
of higher levels of subjectivity. While the mark test was intended to be a more objective 
measure of self-recognition than mere descriptions or anecdotes of behavior indicating 
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self-recognition, it too fell prey to the variations of subjective interpretation as different 
researchers disagreed about which purportedly objective observations of behavior should 
count as evidence for passing the mark test, and hence for possessing the capacity for 
self-recognition. 
 The scientists were looking for a capacity that they hoped could be inter-
subjectively verified through their own observations; however, they couldn’t agree on 
what the behavior of the animals signified or meant for that capacity. Various researchers 
had different standards for the kinds and frequencies of behavior that would justify the 
conclusion that the animals recognized themselves in the mirror. Some studies required 
that the animal touch the marked area more than it did in a previous session in front of the 
mirror before the area was marked. Others required that the animal touch the marked area 
more often while looking in the mirror than when not looking in the mirror. Others still 
required that the animal touch the mark at least five times while looking in the mirror. 
 Mitchell quotes Swartz, Sarauw, & Evans: 
[I]f the question is “What is passing?” in relation to the mark test… [t]he 
easy answer is “touching the mark on the head while using the mirror to 
guide the hand to the mark.” However, behavior is rarely as simple as that. 
(577) 
As a demonstration of the difficulties encountered in the mark test, in this video 
(“Bonobo Self-Recognition In Camera Viewer”1) of a young bonobo looking into the 
picture viewer of a video camera it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine from its 
behavior whether the bonobo is actually recognizing itself in the viewer or not. 
On the other hand, and more germane to Sartre’s response to the problem of other 
minds, we might consider how comfortable we would feel hurling insults at this bonobo.  
 
V. The Bonobo Mirror Project 
                                                 
1 Published on YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JoKiTs67J4k 
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The Primate Behavior and Conservation course out of which “The Bonobo Mirror 
Project” arose relied on the QUEST method of inquiry which contains the following 
steps: 1) Question and observe 2) Uncover comparative questions 3) Explore predictions 
4) Start action plan and gather data, and 5) Think hard about findings and share 
discoveries. I found the course both challenging and rewarding in terms of the 
opportunities it provided for me to bring philosophy together with this scientific method 
of inquiry. My goal for the project was to attempt to determine, drawing on Sartre’s 
solution to the problem of other minds and using the Quest Inquiry Method, whether 
human visitors to the indoor bonobo exhibit at the Cincinnati Zoo provide behavioral 
evidence that they recognize that they are in the presence of another mind (or a higher 
level of consciousness or subjectivity).   
 
A. Comparative Question and Prediction  
My comparative question was: How does the relationship of positive to negative remarks 
about the bonobos at the indoor exhibit at the Cincinnati Zoo and Botanical Gardens 
compare to the relationship of positive to negative remarks made directly to the bonobos?  
I also took into account the factors of age and gender of the visitors. My prediction was 
that the ratio of positive to negative remarks made directly to the bonobos would be 
greater than the ratio of positive to negative remarks made about the bonobos. I also 
predicted that adults and women would make less negative remarks to the bonobos, and 
children and males would make more negative remarks to the bonobos, based on the 
different amounts and kinds of socialization experienced by the different groups. My 
assumption was that people would not make negative remarks directly to the bonobos as 
frequently as they made negative remarks about the bonobos to other people if they 
sensed that they were in the presence of another mind or subject, because to do so would 
bring them a feeling of shame for the objects that they would become in the 
consciousness of the bonobos-as-subjects. 
 My prediction that the ratio of positive to negative remarks by visitors to the 
bonobos would be higher than the ratio of positive to negative remarks about the 
bonobos, if correct, would lend support to the conclusion that human visitors do feel 
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some level of pride or shame before the bonobos, differentially reflected in their behavior 
toward them as compared to their remarks about them. This, based on Sartre’s theory, 
would indicate that the visitors do discern the presence of a mind or sense of personhood, 
i.e., a relatively high level of complexity in terms of consciousness, on the part of the 
bonobos.  
 Angus Gemmell concludes “Gazing into the Bonobo Mirror,” an essay on his 
journey to the bonobos in the Congo, as follows: 
After spending a week with the trackers, observing, absorbing, and filming 
bonobos, each of us was moved by the feeling of being watched curiously 
by another conscious being. When a bonobo is close and looks you in the 
eye, it’s like holding a mirror up to humanity’s collective past. (41)  
It is my hope that this project will provide some small amount of evidence to support this 
conclusion.  
 
B. Methods 
I tested my hypothesis by engaging in three sessions of two hours each of continuous 
sampling of remarks made by visitors to the indoor bonobo exhibit on two consecutive 
weekends between 1:00 pm and 5:00 pm. A total of 100 visitors to the indoor bonobo 
exhibit were surveyed, and 96 remarks were recorded and categorized.  I recorded the 
data collected on a generic behavior frequency data sheet with columns for the following 
categories: number of visitor, gender of visitor, age of visitor, positive and negative 
remarks, and key subject words. (Appendix 1) 
 One challenge that I ran into at this point was how to define positive and negative 
remarks in a way that would satisfy the scientific requirements of the method of inquiry, 
which favors facts over value judgments. Fortunately, I regularly teach Practical 
Reasoning (PHI 100), a course in informal logic, so I was able to produce objective 
definitions for positive and negative remarks: 
  A positive remark is defined as a remark containing words or phrases whose 
dictionary definition denotes a positive evaluative judgment, e.g., good, intelligent, cute, 
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etc. A positive evaluative judgment is defined as an indication that an individual or group 
of individuals meets certain specifiable standards. 
 A negative remark is defined as a remark containing words or phrases whose 
dictionary definition denotes a negative evaluative judgment, e.g., bad, stupid, ugly, etc. 
A negative evaluative judgment is defined as an indication that an individual or group of 
individuals does not meet certain specifiable standards. 
 Remarks that were ambiguous due to tone of voice or context were omitted. A 
new remark was determined by a change of subject, a change of addressee, or (of course) 
a change of speaker. 
 
C. Results and Consequences 
Overall Results 
The overall comparison of the ratio of positive to negative remarks about the bonobos to 
the ratio of positive to negative remarks to the bonobos reveals 31 positive remarks about 
the bonobos to 47 negative remarks about the bonobos and 9 positive remarks to the 
bonobos to 9 negative remarks to the bonobos.  
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This result is in accordance with my prediction. However, the difference between the two 
does not appear to be as dramatic as I originally anticipated. It is important to note, 
however, that of the 9 negative remarks to the bonobos, 7 of them were actually 
commands that I interpreted as negative remarks because they implied that the bonobos 
should be doing something else. Examples of such commands include: “Be more 
photogenic,” “Stand still for me,” “Play some dodge ball,” etc. One of the negative 
remarks was a negative evaluation of one of the bonobo’s behavior when playing ball, 
“You missed it, buddy.” Thus, only one of the negative remarks to the bonobos was 
actually a direct insult, i.e., “Boo, trailer trash, you’re it.” 
 Some examples of positive remarks to the bonobos include: “Hey, cool bonobo!” 
“Hello, sweet guy,” “I love you,” and “Hey, buddy.” The most common positive remarks 
about the bonobos concerned their cuteness and their similarity to humans. The most 
common negative remarks about the bonobos concerned the appearance of the female 
bonobo’s behind, their grooming habits, and their behavior with their own excrement. 
 
Results by Age and Gender 
Categorizing the remarks by age and gender reveals that male children made 0 positive 
remarks about the bonobos and 15 negative remarks about the bonobos. I found this to be 
extremely surprising. Female children made 8 positive remarks about the bonobos and 11 
negative remarks about the bonobos. Among adults, male adults made 3 positive remarks 
about the bonobos and 4 negative remarks about the bonobos. Female adults made 20 
positive remarks about the bonobos and 21 negative remarks about the bonobos. 
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 Female children made 1 positive remark to the bonobos and 4 negative remarks to 
the bonobos. This differs slightly from my prediction, as I would have thought that male 
children would make more negative remarks to the bonobos than female children.  
Among adults, my predictions about the differences between genders and between ages 
were more correct. Male adults made 3 positive remarks about the bonobos and 4 
negative remarks about the bonobos. Male adults made 2 positive remarks to the bonobos 
and 1 negative remark to the bonobos. Female adults made 20 positive remarks about the 
bonobos and 21 negative remarks about the bonobos. Female adults made 4 positive 
remarks to the bonobos and 1 negative remark to the bonobos. This tracks along with my 
prediction that adults and women would make less negative remarks to the bonobos and 
children and males would make more negative remarks to the bonobos. However, my 
results also seem to indicate that the gender differences do not seem to take effect until 
the onset of adulthood. 
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Results by Keyword  
My data collection sheet includes a column for keywords in the remarks of the visitors 
surveyed. Throughout the course of data collection, I noticed a number of different kinds 
of remarks that occurred quite frequently. These remarks often could not be classified as 
positive or negative or as being about the bonobos or directed to them. They seem to 
occupy a territory in between. However, they occurred quite frequently and seem to 
indicate an awareness on the part of the speakers of a relatively complex level of 
consciousness or subjectivity in the bonobos, by way of self-recognition on the part of the 
visitors. These remarks include what I have labeled Intentions, Identifications, and 
Cooing/Baby Talk. Intentions are defined as an attributing of intentions to the bonobos 
either indirectly, for example, “Look, he’s sleeping with his favorite ball”; or by putting 
words into the mouths of the bonobos, e.g., “He’s saying, ‘I’m sleepy. Give me a 
blanket’.” Surprisingly, the attempt to put words in the bonobos’ mouths occurred 6 
times. This attempt along with the attempt to put thoughts in their heads and ascribe 
motives to their behavior occurred 24 times. Identifications are defined as remarks which 
either make a general claim of how the bonobos are like us, which is not surprising given 
that the signage at the exhibit reports that they share approximately 98% of our DNA, but 
also personal identifications, e.g., “I do that too, cuddle up and eat orange peels,” or “He 
knows another monkey when he sees one,” said by an older woman to a child. 
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Surprisingly, there were 7 such personal identifications. Cooing/Baby Talk is defined as 
remarks about the bonobos to other people but said in a cooing tone of voice meant for 
the bonobos, e.g., “Awww, look how cuuuuuuute he is,” in a tone normally used to talk 
to/about human babies. 
 After the data collection process, I went through the keywords and categorized the 
comments in terms of the content of their keywords using the following categories: 
Behavior, Appearance, Environment, Intentions, Identifications, Cooing/Baby Talk, and 
Miscellaneous.  Out of the 78 comments recorded about the bonobos: 4 were exclusively 
about their behavior with no intentions, identifications or cooing involved; 23 were about 
their physical appearance with no intentions, identifications, or cooing involved; 24 were 
about their intentions, 15 established identifications, and 4 involved baby talk/ cooing. 
There were 5 additional miscellaneous remarks. 
 
 
  
Consequences 
My results indicate that visitors to the indoor bonobo exhibit at the zoo make fewer 
negative remarks relative to positive remarks to the bonobos in comparison to the same 
relation of negative to positive remarks about the bonobos. Given the different kinds and 
amount of socialization on the part of males and females, and children and adults, 
respectively, it is to be expected that adult males will make more such negative remarks 
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to the bonobos than adult females and that children will make more such negative 
remarks than adults. While the sample size is too small to conclude that this study 
confirms these expectations, nothing in the results refutes them. Moreover, the content of 
more than half of the remarks also indicates a kind of self-recognition by the visitors in 
their perceptions of the bonobos. Taken together, if Sartre’s theory concerning the role of 
shame in the recognition of other minds is right (and my application of this theory to the 
bonobos is valid), this data supports the conclusion that visitors to the bonobo exhibit do 
discern the existence of a more complex level of consciousness or subjectivity on the part 
of the bonobos. 
 However, these findings also open up a number of other questions that must be 
answered before this data could be used to support a more ethical approach to the 
treatment and handling of bonobos. Among these questions are the following: 1) Does the 
relative dearth of negative remarks in relation to positive remarks to the bonobos actually 
arise from the phenomenon of avoiding shame before the bonobos on the part of the 
visitors? As one means of answering this question we might also ask if the results 
concerning age and gender based on a relatively small sample in this study are supported 
by similar results from a more statistically significant sample. 2) How do the evaluative 
force and content of the remarks made about/to the bonobos compare to remarks made 
about/to other animals on exhibit at the zoo? And 3) How do the responses to the 
bonobos of zookeepers and those who work closely with the bonobos compare to those of 
visitors to the exhibit? These questions among others may serve as springboards for 
future investigative projects. 
 
D. The Strangest Thing I Saw 
Although it didn’t fit into my data, I’d like to conclude with the strangest thing I saw 
during this study, which perhaps more than anything else convinces me that human 
visitors discern a high level of subjectivity on the part of the bonobos through a process 
of self-recognition. A middle-aged mother and teenage daughter were taunting the 
bonobos with Dots candy. The mother was banging the box of Dots on the window of the 
exhibit, bouncing up and down, and saying, “Look what I’ve got—yum, yum!” over and 
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over. The teenage daughter was holding an individual piece of candy up to the window. 
The female bonobo got so worked up at this bizarre display that she started jumping up 
and down, growling loudly, and putting her fists on top of her head as if to imitate pulling 
a top-knot pony tail which the mother was wearing in her hair.  
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Appendix 1: Generic Behavior Frequency Data Sheet 
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